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COMMENTARY
CONCEALING OUR MEANING FROM OURSELVES:
THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF
DISCRIMINATION
DREW S. DAYS, III*
Of course, I join with all of the people this morning in welcoming
many of Dean Griswold's comments concerning the Bakke case and
what he refers to as the social and philosophical problems raised by the
responsibility of society to allocate scarce resources. To those of you
who did not attend this morning, and even for those of you who did, let
me be so bold as to characterize Dean Griswold's presentation as I un-
derstood it. Dean Griswold argued that the Supreme Court has held
that race may be a factor in the admissions process; that the decision
has some legal basis; and that it represents an interim answer to diffi-
cult social and philosophical problems that our society faces in view of
the significant absence of minorities from important sectors of our na-
tional life. Nevertheless, he finds the Bakke decision and some of its
implications troubling, first, because of the impact that the decision will
have upon individuals whom he refers to as innocent persons who have
not been guilty of any discrimination themselves, and second, because
of the impact that the decision may have upon standards of excellence
and certain merit-derived principles. Finally, he hopes that this essen-
tially social process of experimentation will proceed in a thoughtful
and careful manner while we sort out our continuing problems of racial
justice and that it ultimately will bring us to the point where we can
honestly claim that we have a colorblind society.
Although I do not quarrel with the essence of Dean Griswold's the-
sis, I do have substantial problems with what I believe is the deem-
phasis he gives to the role of the law in addressing the problems of
affirmative action. Clearly, his reasons for not treating the legal issues
are not associated with his lack of understanding of those principles.
* Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice.
A B., 1963, Hamilton College; LL.B., 1966, Yale University.
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Rather, I think that his article, whether intentionally or not, reflects the
subtle but unmistakable shift in focus that our society has taken away
from how to remedy the present effects of intentional and systematiq.
discrimination against minorities and women to questions of how tle
economic and political pies of America ought to be split up, given the
various competing claims upon limited resources; away from what is
just to what will sell, what will pacify, and what will postpone possible
confrontation over the allocation of scarce resources among various
groups in our society.
Dean Griswold, to the extent that I am right about this, is not alone.
I share part of the responsibility for this subtle shift. Perhaps I have
been a victim of the shift. Nevertheless, I think we have seen a signifi-
cant shift that I find troubling, a shift that is essentially pointed not in
the direction of helping ultimately to solve these problems, but toward
creating greater confusion in trying to sort out competing claims, alle-
gations of discrimination, and questions of guilt. It seems to me that
despite all our history tells us about systematic discrimination against
certain minorities, most notably blacks and women, I believe we have
reached a point in the late 1970's where most nonminority Americans
believe that all problems of discrimination have been solved, and that
further claims by minorities for greater access to our institutions consti-
tute overreaching and attempts to take things to which they have no
entitlement at the expense of nonminorities whose claims are
unassailable.
Dean Griswold, of course, addressed some of the legal considera-
tions, and he recognized that there were legal bases for affirmative ac-
tion. He talked about the fourteenth amendment and the equal
protection clause. He talked about the Civil War and slavery. Cer-
tainly, all those things are true, but it seems to me that to the extent we
focus narrowly on that history, we miss a significant fact about our so-
ciety in the 1970's: discrimination continues to be with us. It is a very
present fact in our modem day society. We do not have to look to
slavery. We do not have to look to Reconstruction. We do not have to
look to the years of "separate but equal" after Plessy v. Ferguson. I We
can look, for example, to the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 which demon-
strated beyond question the extent to which our society was
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Louisiana law requiring the railroads to provide equal, but separate,
passenger cars for whites and blacks held valid).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976).
[Vol. 1979:81
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/11
COMMENTARY
filled-riddled-with the effects of past discrimination and a present
and ongoing, intentional discrimination against certain minority
groups. We can look to 1965 when Congress passed the Voting Rights
Act,3 also the result of a determination by Congress that there was
ongoing, pervasive, vicious racial discrimination with respect to the ex-
ercise of the franchise. We can look to 1968 when Congress deter-
mined that there continued to be extensive discrimination in the fair
housing area.4 We can look to 1972 when Congress decided that state
and local governments and the federal government itself had engaged
in discrimination in employment and, therefore, it was necessary for
the courts to address that problem and try to develop remedies.5 We
can look to the 1974 amendments dealing with sex discrimination in
housing6 and to the 1975 extension of the Voting Rights Act.7 So we
are not talking merely about slavery. We are not talking merely about
the Civil War. We are not talking merely about Reconstruction. We
are talking about a very short period of time between 1964 and 1978
during which we have been dealing with present discrimination and the
present consequences of longstanding discrimination.
I fear that unless America relearns its history lessons about discrimi-
nation, we will be long in seeing the day for which both Dean Griswold
and I hope; namely, the day when we can put race aside and go on to
the business of building a truly just society that is not devoted to mak-
ing distinctions based upon race or sex or ethnic origin. Regrettably,
very few of our elected officials seem willing to teach that lesson. Our
courts also seem to have become less able to do so. And to a certain
degree, it seems to me, Dean Griswold, too, fails in his article to make
the points and teach the lessons that I feel must be taught.
Let me give you some examples of how far we have fled from the
reality of discrimination in 1978. Shortly after the Bakke decision, I
happened to be in Seattle. I picked up a local newspaper and saw a
cartoon that capsulized better than anything else I have seen this flight
from reality. Let me describe it to you. It was a cartoon that showed
five white men dressed in black robes carrying Allan Bakke quickly
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (current version at 42
US.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1976)).
4. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, Title II, § 206(a), 82
Stat. 504 (1968) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605 (1976).
7, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1976).
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past a group of bedraggled, downtrodden, shabbily dressed blacks car-
rying picket signs that asserted the need for further remedies for dis-
crimination. And out of the mouth of the Allan Bakke character came
the phrase, "Free at last, free at last." For those of you who miss the
irony of that cartoon, let me remind you that the quotation is most
often attributed to Martin Luther King's speech-the "I Have A
Dream" speech--to his dream that one day his children would be able
to live in a society that had no discrimination. What the cartoon com-
municates, I think, is that we have really forgotten about discrimina-
tion. We have forgotten the history of discrimination. We have
forgotten that there is ongoing discrimination with which we must deal.
If I were a Martian and visited the earth last year and looked at the
docket of the United States Supreme Court for the 1977-78 term, and it
I were a learned Martian and had read An American Dilemma9 several
years back and wanted to figure out what had happened to American
society in terms of dealing with this problem since 1944, I think that I
would have been forced to conclude some very remarkable things
about this society; essentially, that discrimination against minorities
had ended (certainly discrimination against blacks) and that, in fact,
the problem had become that blacks were in the majority and were
controlling the institutions of the society and allocating scarce resources
in ways that discriminated against the white minority. The Bakke case,
of course, is a perfect example. If one reads Bakke out of context, it is
quite possible to reach the conclusion that minorities are populating
our professional and medical schools in incredible numbers-in fact,
taking places from thousands and thousands of nonminority students.
Of course, we know the reality is that most black medical students are
educated at two institutions in this country-Howard University and
Meharry Medical College. But one would think, looking at Bakke and
the discussion surrounding it, that somhehow this is not the case. If one
looks at the AT. & T case that the Supreme Court decided not to ac-
cept after the Bakke decision-simply denied certiorari 0 -one might
conclude that the largest corporation in the world with some three-
8. King, IHave a Dream, in BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (A,
Meier, E. Rudwick, & F. Broderick eds. 1971).
9. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA; THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMoC-
RACY (1944).
10. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3145
(1978).
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quarters of a million employees was controlled by minorities and wo-
men, and that white males had been kicked out of lucrative and impor-
tant positions in that institution. Well, of course, that is not true. The
4. T & T consent decree was at issue for five years and had some goals
for increased participation of minorities and women that approached
two percent. If one looks at the Los Angeles Set-Aside case,I' a case that
the Supreme Court remanded to the district court for consideration of
mootness after Bakke, one might think that minorities had taken over
federal procurement and the federal works process and were forcing
nonminorities out of that business. In fact, we are talking about a ten
percent minority set-aside, and in many instances we are talking about
situations in which participation of minorities has not begun to ap-
proach ten percent.
Now, how this can possibly happen is to me a question that we must
attempt to address. Certainly, one of the answers, it seems to me, is
language. I was forced to confront this as a possible answer by my
recollection of an essay by George Orwell, "Politics and the English
Language,"' 2 which I read many years ago as a college student. With-
out going into great detail, what he essentially said was that political
language is used to hide truth, to obscure reality; and certainly some
types of intentions-bad intentions-can be developed and articulated
en masse in political language so that thought can corrupt language, if
you will. But he said something that I think is even more interesting.
He said that there is the chance that we can use this political language
to the point where we begin to believe it. We begin to forget that it is
indeed political language designed to mask reality, and it begins to
mask reality even from ourselves. I think that has happened to a cer-
tain extent when we look at the language of affirmative action. In fact,
the phrase "affarmative action" itself may be the greatest violator of one
of Orwell's principles. It means all things to all people. It can mean
everything from hard-and-fast racial quotas to recruitment efforts that
direct an increase in the pool of minorities or women who might be
considered for certain types of positions in our society. To paraphrase
Orwell, such usages can become so incorporated into our speech that
they begin to construct our sentences for us."3 They even think our
11. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Secretary of Corn., 459 F. Supp. 766 (C.D. Cal.),
acated, 98 S. Ct. 3132 (1978).
12. G. ORWELL, Politics and the English Language, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 162 (1954).
13. Id. at 163.
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thoughts for us, and to a certain extent, as needed, they will perform
the important service of partially concealing our meaning even from
ourselves. Our nation's history of racism and sexism is indeed a pain-
ful one with which to live, and it is not surprising that we have reached
out for alliterate and innocuous terms to mask the fact that what we are
doing is attempting to rectify our past wrongs.
I talked about affirmative action. What about the phrase "under-
utilization"? In many instances it is used to mask the fact that what is
being addressed is intentional, systematic discrimination against mi-
norities and women. We talk about "economically and culturally de-
prived" persons-again, another mellifluous phrase that I think avoids
having to confront the fact that we still have very present and painful
problems to resolve.
Of course, when we become so obscure in the language that we use in
order to mask the fact that we are dealing with past discrimination, it
brings forth another set of phrases that is equally devoid of meaning,
that corrupts the whole intellectual process of trying to analyze what we
are about and how we resolve the problems that we have identified.
"Preferential treatment"-who knows what that means? We talk about
it out of context, and it becomes anything that anyone wants it to be.
We talk very much about the distinction between quotas and goals.
Well, there is, in my estimation, and I think Dean Griswold touched
upon this point, no real distinction between quotas and goals if we look
at specific contexts. Certainly, when we constantly talk about it in the
abstract, it is possible to play all kinds of games with those semantic
distinctions. And, of course, we speak of "reverse discrimination,"
which I assume is the opposite of discrimination. I really do not know
what this phrase means, but it is a phrase that begins to infect our lan-
guage with ambiguity and imprecision.
So, we really do not know where we are going. And I think we reach
the ultimate point when those who are trying to deal with forms of
discrimination begin to use the language of obscurantism and say:
"No, we are not trying to impose quotas; we are seeking goals," or, "we
are not engaging in reverse discrimination; we are engaging in affirma-
tive action." That type of dialogue, it seems to me, does not advance
the discussion at all.
Now, there is another explanation, it seems to me, for what I think is
this sad state of affairs. There has been an absence of litigation in re-
cent years by minorities and women directed toward establishing the
[Vol. 1979:81
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existence of past discrimination. It may well be, and I use this phrase
with some trepidation, that the people who were most likely to bring
suits challenging exclusionary practices of our institutions have been
"bought off" by affirmative action. I use the term "bought off" not to
describe any evil intent or evil participation or bribery, but to say sim-
ply that they have been, as very talented people, admitted into these
programs, admitted into these institutions, and therefore, incorporated
into the process. If we look at the pre-Brown period, we see the Gaines'
and the Sweatt's and the Sippuel's and the McLaurin's. They were the
cream of the crop of minority students, and they were kept out. They
sued and they got in. Well, such people are now in many institutions.
There also has been an absence of administrative records on the
existence of discrimination in many activities. I look at the statutes that
I enforce through the courts or through administrative agencies. The
nature of modem civil rights statutes, regulations and executive orders
is that there often is no need to establish past discrimination. If we
look at Title VII, which relates to employment discrimination, 4 it has
reached the point where one can make a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by showing discriminatory effects; it is not a necessity to show evil
purpose or intent to discriminate. Similarly, under the housing dis-
crimination statute, Title VIII,15 there has been a general acceptance of
an "effects" test. I administer provisions of the Voting Rights Act 16
under which I am not required to find that there has been discrimina-
tion or discriminatory intent at work in the development of a proposed
change in voting procedures. I simply write a very nice letter that says
I am unable to conclude that the proposed change is not the result of a
purpose to discriminate, or will not have a discriminatory effect.
Therefore, no record is made in this process.
To the extent that there has been litigation, it seems to me, it has
been litigation on a bare record in which issues of discrimination are
the last ones to be dealt with or often not dealt with at all. Bakke, of
course, is a perfect example of this. These lawsuits essentially have the
tollowing defects. First, we are engaged in so-called reverse discrimi-
nation. And we find an unwillingness on the part of institutions sued
by whites or males to rely upon past discrimination-or present dis-
crimination, for that matter-to justify special programs for minorities
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000f(1976).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1976).
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and women. Second, the compulsion to present the bold questions of
racial and gender preference to the courts for adjudication really
reduces these lawsuits to what Dean Griswold referred to as essentially
social and philosophical questions. And third, to the extent that these
programs have been attacked, they reveal that there has been little ef-
fort on the part of the affected institutions to tailor their "affirmative
action" or special admissions programs to the facts at hand, to the
unique problems that those institutions have faced in the past or are
facing presently.
In the Bakke case, as you probably are aware, there was no effort to
evaluate the extent to which discrimination by the University of Cali-
fornia system had occurred in the past or was occurring at the time that
Bakke sued, nor the extent to which other state agencies in California
had been guilty of discrimination that had or might have had an impact
upon the exclusion of minorities at the Davis Medical School. There
was instead a reliance by the medical school upon a desire to remedy
"societal discrimination," to increase the "mix," to insure that there
were greater numbers of minorities in the medical profession providing
medical assistance to minority groups.' 7 And, of course, there was no
record on the extent to which there was an attempt to tailor the pro-
gram at Davis Medical School to the unique problems of that
institution.
One can look at other examples presently before the Court. Dean
Griswold referred to issues that don't specifically relate to admissions
or education, and I will do so as well for a limited purpose. He men-
tioned the Weber case.'" The Weber case, as he correctly described,
involves a program in which minorities and women were given special
preference in entering training for craft positions at a Kaiser plant in
Grammercy, Louisiana. The record in that case is devoid, as Dean
Griswold correctly points out, of any indication of past discrimination.
But I think it is helpful to understand that though the record does not
include anything with respect to past discrimination, there is neverthe-
less a very strong indication that the plant had engaged in past discrim-
ination. Now, why was that omitted from the record? One of the
things that the United States Government has attempted to do in the
Weber case aid in other comparable cases is to bring to the attention
17. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
18. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cerl. granted,
99 S. Ct. 720 (1978) (No. 78-435).
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of the courts that these records are inadequate, that they do not present
the full picture.
Bakke did not involve any participation in the case by minority stu-
dents who were the beneficiaries or potential beneficiaries of the affirm-
ative action or special admissions programs. Their absence from the
litigation, it seems to me, deprived the court of an opportunity to hear a
critical voice in the debate over whether the program was justified and
legitimate. Dean Griswold mentions the Cramer case, 9 a sex discrimi-
nation case, which is back in the district court after Bakke. Dean Gris-
wold pointed out that the Fourth Circuit opinion is unrecorded and
unpublished. I have the benefit of getting such unpublished opinions.
Let me point out to you that the reason why the Court decided that the
case ought to be remanded to the district court was that the United
States Government demonstrated a substantial question whether there
had, in fact, been discrimination against Professor Cramer. Indeed,
there was evidence that Cramer was considered, that other white males
were considered, and that, in fact, a white male was ultimately selected
for one of the remaining positions. And yet, this information was never
presented to the Court. It was not offered by the University; it was not
presented by Professor Cramer. It took the United States Government
to come into the case to raise this question and to bring to the court this
additional information.
The Detroit Police case2" is another case in which the Government
has intervened. Now, this is somewhat different from the other cases I
have mentioned because the mayor of Detroit had found woeful "un-
derrepresentation"-that is a "weasel" word also--of minorities in the
police department in a community that was fifty percent minority; he
set about the task of increasing black representation. He talked very
little about remedying the effect of past discrimination; he essentially
talked about the social and philosophical and theoretical problems of
justice in Detroit. When that particular program was challenged by
white police officers, the district court found that "reverse discrimina-
tion" had occurred, and that there was no basis for the mayor of De-
troit to set up such a program. Our analysis of the record in that case
leads us to conclude that there was ample evidence of past discrimina-
tion, and we have filed an amicus brief in the court of appeals that goes
19. Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 586 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1978).
20. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1005 (E.D. Mich.
1978).
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on for eighty-nine pages to document evidence from the record of that
discrimination.
It is understandable, however, that these records are inadequate.
Why not be on the side of the angels? Why should an institution go to
the point of admitting its past discrimination? It serves the purpose of
the institution to simply say that it is merely seeking to provide a better
mix, better diversity, better opportunities to participate in society for
those members who happen to be minorities or women. And, of
course, from a strictly legal standpoint, there are pitfalls for institutions
in admitting that they have been guilty of past or present discrimina-
tion. The minute they do, they leave themselves open for suits by mi-
norities and women seeking backpay and other types of equitable relief
based upon that evidence of past discrimination, that admission. But it
seems to me that the consequence of this process, absent some interven-
tion by a third party (such as the Justice Department or minorities or
women) who has a stake in the outcome that goes beyond that of the
parties heretofore involved in the litigation, is a jurisprudence that at-
tempts to reconcile the use of race or ethnic origin or sex for political or
social reasons, on the one hand, with constitutional colorblindness in
general, on the other.
Now, Professor Calebressi of Yale University Law School recently
gave a speech at Catholic University in Washington in which I think he
correctly pointed out, and I am telescoping remarkably his very
thoughtful comments, that we can come up with suggestions such as
diversity, or providing better access, or theories of philosophical equal-
ity to justify what we are doing. But that will last only for so long. At
some point we have to come face to face with the fact that we have
constitutional principles that are at odds. That conflict cannot be
"fudged." The solution ultimately will have to come from an identifi-
cation of the truly legal and constitutional bases for what we are doing.
What must be done? It seems to me that we have to reject the notion
that the matter before us amounts to essentially a political or social
question; it is at root a question of discrimination, of constitutional or
statutory violation. We should remember that if we scratch below the
surface of most American institutions, we will find racism and sexism.
The crucial inquiry, then, is not whether, but how much. How that
inquiry is resolved and answered will determine the nature of the rem-
edy. It seems to me that further action through litigation or adminis-
trative action must emphasize the extent to which discrimination
[Vol. 1979:81
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/11
COMMENTARY
actually exists. There, of course, has to be permissible scope for volun-
tary action based upon some reasonable estimation of the existence of
past discrimination. And I join Dean Griswold in thinking that many
of the answers may come from legislative and executive action. But I
think it is important even at the legislative and executive action level
that those efforts be bottomed upon discrimination not from the distant
past, but upon discrimination known to exist today. In one sense, we
are at a stage very much like that which we experienced a few years
after Brown v. Board ofEducation2l when a number of northern school
desegregation cases were brought. They essentially asserted that Brown
stood for the proposition that if blacks were isolated in public educa-
tion, there was a violation of the fourteenth amendment, and there was
a need for remedy. But the courts said that was not true; there was a
necessity to demonstrate intent. And so we spent approximately thir-
teen or fourteen years up to the Denver school desegregation decision"2
rethinking the nature of discrimination in the North and developing
techniques to demonstrate the existence of that discrimination. It
seems to me that if we do not focus once again upon the nature and
scope of discrimination, we are really on the "slippery slope."
Dean Griswold's article and presentation suggest that there is really
very little likelihood that we will come up with meaningful and satis-
factory answers to the social and philosophical problems that he has
raised, and that we will become more obscure and more inexact in
terms of defining what we want. I sincerely hope this does not occur.
But unless we are extremely careful, I think that we will be thrown into
the political process in the worst sense of the word-a dog fight over
scarce resources that ultimately cannot advance the society and will not
bring us to the point of being a colorblind society truly open to talent.
21 347 U.S. 488 (1954).
22. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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